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TV WARS: EXCLUSIVE CONTENT AND PLATFORM
COMPETITION IN PAY TV*
Helen Weeds
The article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of premium television programming. Static
analysis shows that a vertically integrated operator with premium programming always supplies this
content to the rival distributor, using per-subscriber fees to soften competition. In a dynamic setting
with switching costs exclusivity confers a market share advantage, benefiting the operator in the
future. Under certain conditions this future benefit outweighs the opportunity cost of forgone
wholesale fees, making exclusivity the preferred choice. Alternative dynamic mechanisms are
explored, identifying essential features. The analysis explains the observed incidence of content
exclusivity in pay TV and provides guidance for policy makers.
Programme content plays a central role in pay TV competition. In choosing between
distributors, consumers base their choice largely on the programming available from
each one.1 In particular, highly attractive ‘premium’ programming, especially live
coverage of popular sports events and recent Hollywood movies, drives consumer
choice.2 By making such content available exclusively to its own subscribers, a
distributor gains market share from its rivals, making exclusivity potentially attractive as
a competitive strategy. For this reason, premium content is often described by
regulators and industry commentators as the ‘new bottleneck’ in broadcasting and new
media markets, in place of the traditional local access bottleneck (Ungerer, 2001;
Nicita and Rossi, 2008).
Access to premium content has been amajor competition concern in the pay TV sector
in a number of countries. By its nature, premium content is oftenmonopolised at source
(e.g. sports coverage requires televisation rights, which are often sold collectively by the
league) or becomes concentrated in the hands of a single pay TV operator (e.g. UK
satellite operator BSkyB has for a long time acquired the first-run pay TVmovie rights of
all six major Hollywood studios, although these sell their rights independently). In the
UK, over the past twenty years, there have been repeated investigations into BSkyB’s
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1 According to Ofcom (2007, para. 3.61), content is the element of consumers’ TV service that is by far the
most often described as ‘must have’, being cited by 88% of consumers.
2 At the 1996 annual meeting of News Corporation (which owns 39.1% of BSkyB) Rupert Murdoch is
reported to have described sport as the ‘battering ram’ of pay TV.
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wholesale supply of its premium sports andmovie channels to other pay TV distributors.3
In 2010, following a three-year investigation, communications regulator Ofcom
imposed a wholesale must-offer regulation on BSkyB’s premium Sky Sports
channels, requiring these to be made available to other distributors at regulated
prices (Ofcom, 2010).4 Elsewhere in Europe, wholesale must-offer remedies have
been imposed on a number of pay TV mergers which created a dominant operator
with control over premium content (Sogecable/Vıa Digital, Spain 2002; Newscorp/
Telepiu, Italy 2003; CanalSat/TPS, France 2006, 2012). In the US programme access
rules, imposed under the 1992 Cable Act, have long required vertically integrated
operators to supply their programming to other distributors; a similar approach is
applied in Canada’s broadcasting distribution regulations under the 1991 Broad-
casting Act. Yet, even in North America, access to programming has been a concern
in two recent mergers: in Comcast/NBCUniversal (USA 2011) and BCE/Astral
Media (Canada 2013) conditions were imposed to reinforce regulations preventing
the merged firm from withholding programming from other distributors. Content
distribution on newly developed mobile platforms and over the internet – rarely
covered by existing regulations, as these apply to traditional ‘linear’ television only –
is increasingly an area of concern to regulators.
A crucial question in these investigations concerns the incentive of a vertically
integrated operator to withhold its premium programming from rival distributors.
While integrated operators claim that they have no incentive to withhold, stressing the
benefits to them of wide distribution, regulators tend to adopt the opposite view,
imposing conditions to ensure wholesale supply. Yet determining whether such
foreclosure is actually taking place – let alone whether it is likely to take place after a
proposed merger – is not straightforward. While Ofcom concluded its 2007–10 Pay TV
investigation stating that ‘Sky is acting on a strategic incentive to restrict supply’
(Ofcom, 2010, para. 7.7), the Competition Appeal Tribunal took the opposite view of
the empirical evidence, ruling that ‘Ofcom’s core competition concern (that Sky had
deliberately withheld from other retailers wholesale supply of its premium channels) is
unfounded’ (Competition Appeal Tribunal, 2012, para. 27).
The question of whether a pay TV operator with premium programming has an
incentive to withhold this content from rival distributors is at the heart of this article.
To address this question, I set up a model of competition between a vertically
integrated operator and an unintegrated distributor, where the two distributors are
horizontally differentiated, and examine the integrated firm’s incentives towards wide
or exclusive distribution. Static analysis shows that, in a setting where wholesale supply
would be expected to expand demand, the integrated distributor always chooses to
supply the rival distributor, using per-subscriber wholesale fees to soften competition
3 1994–5: first Office of Fair Trading (OFT) review of BSkyB’s wholesale programming supply; 1996:
second OFT review; 2001–2: OFT Competition Act investigation; 2007–10: Ofcom Pay TV investigation; 2010–
2: Competition Commission Movies on Pay TV investigation; 2013–4: Ofcom investigation into BSkyB’s
wholesale supply of Sky Sports 1 and 2 to BT (ongoing at time of writing).
4 In August 2012 Ofcom’s competition finding was overturned on appeal at the Competition Appeal
Tribunal (CAT). In February 2014 the Court of Appeal upheld an appeal against the CAT’s judgement
brought by BT and Ofcom; accordingly, at the time of writing, the case has returned to the CAT for further
consideration.
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and extract revenues. Intuitively, this is because the integrated operator can always find
a wholesale contract that makes it more profitable to supply the rival distributor than to
foreclose it, taking account of both its gain in wholesale revenue and its loss of retail
market share. Adding a dynamic element to competition in the form of a switching
cost, exclusive content distribution gives the integrated firm an initial market share
advantage that is amplified by dynamic effects. Under certain conditions – for highly
attractive programming and less differentiated distributors – the future benefit from
gaining market share outweighs the current opportunity cost of forgone wholesale
revenues, making exclusivity the preferred choice of the integrated firm. Other
possible dynamic mechanisms – platform investment and exclusion – are also outlined.
These models highlight the essential feature required for exclusivity: some form of
scale effect such that greater asymmetry in market shares raises industry profit.
The analysis explains the observed incidence of exclusive content distribution in
pay TV markets across many countries. A puzzling feature of the pay TV sector is the
variety of distribution patterns that are observed, even when wholesale arrangements
are freely negotiated in the absence of regulation. In many instances, a vertically
integrated operator chooses to supply its premium content to rival distributors but in
others premium content is supplied exclusively to the operator’s own subscribers.
Sometimes a mixed pattern is seen in which the operator supplies some rivals but
not others. Two broad patterns can be observed, which are explained by this article
as follows. First, exclusive content is often seen between operators that compete
head-to-head using the same distribution technology (e.g. satellite-to-satellite),
especially during a war of attrition, while competing distributors using alternative
technologies (e.g. cable) are supplied. The article explains that the low degree of
horizontal differentiation and possibility of exclusion makes it desirable to withhold
premium content from a similar, satellite-based competitor, while more differenti-
ated distributors that are difficult to exclude (cable) are supplied. Secondly,
exclusivity is often employed by emerging platforms: several European telecoms
incumbents building internet television (IPTV) platforms have used exclusive
content to facilitate their entry into pay TV and to compete against their broadband
rivals. For these players, the desire to build market share in the presence of switching
costs and sunk investments provides an incentive for exclusive content.
The article has the following lessons for policy makers. While competition cases in
the pay TV sector have rested on the claim that an integrated operator has an
incentive to withhold its premium content from rival distributors, this article
demonstrates that for such a finding to be substantiated a coherent dynamic
mechanism must be present. The mechanism must be based on some form of scale
effect such that the asymmetry induced by content exclusivity raises industry profit.
This principle can be used to evaluate arguments put forward in competition cases
(such as Ofcom’s Pay TV investigation), providing guidance to regulators. Secondly,
welfare analyses in the article show that the welfare effects of exclusivity, and its
impacts on consumers, are not straightforward: while exclusivity entails some loss of
allocative efficiency, consumers may benefit overall due to more intense price
competition and gains from scale effects. However, outcomes can be mixed, with
contrasting impacts on different groups of consumers.
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The article’s contribution is as follows. Existing literature cannot adequately explain
input foreclosure in a setting where a single vertically integrated firm faces horizontally
differentiated downstream competitors. While several papers find that foreclosure may
arise in markets with two or more suppliers of the upstream input,5 in the case of a
single upstream supplier (a ‘bottleneck’), a foreclosure result is found only when
either: wholesale contracting is constrained to take place on the basis of lump sum fees
only; or the unintegrated downstream firm is sufficiently inefficient relative to the
integrated firm (see literature review below). The article fills this gap by providing an
explanation for the observation of exclusivity in a setting where neither of these
conditions hold: its finding that exclusivity can arise in a dynamic setting with scale
effects is novel.
In the context of pay TV, the article demonstrates the role of exclusive content in
a foreclosure strategy and illuminates the circumstances under which exclusivity is
likely to arise. The analysis is based on a framework commonly used to model
competition in pay TV which captures the main features of the industry. While
the model used in the main part of the article has been chosen to minimise
vertical contracting inefficiencies, providing a tractable framework for analysis, an
Appendix demonstrates that the findings are not driven by this choice. The topic is
highly policy-relevant at a time when competition authorities and communi-
cations regulators in Europe and elsewhere are grappling with issues of exclusive
content distribution, in both pay TV and new media. The article informs these
debates.6
The relevance of the article is not limited to pay TV. Its messages are relevant to any
sector where an upstream input controlled by one operator is required by, or
important to, downstream competitors. The analysis can equally be applied to ‘killer
apps’ in computing and video games markets: by retaining exclusivity over important
software or popular video games, the platform provider – in this case the producer of
the computer (operating) system or games console – boosts its own retail sales at the
expense of rivals, which may be beneficial for similar dynamic reasons to those
outlined in this article. More generally, the analysis is relevant to any bottleneck
situation, such as access to the local loop in telecommunications and broadband
markets. The article casts light on the circumstances under which a foreclosure strategy
may be chosen in these industries.
Exclusive content distribution in pay TV is the subject of five articles related to this one.
Armstrong (1999) analyses incentives of a monopoly upstream provider to supply its
premium content exclusively or non-exclusively to pay TV distributors, under lump-sum
and per-subscriber fees respectively. Weeds (2014) considers the impact of advertising
funding on the distribution choice of a content provider. Harbord and Ottaviani (2001)
5 When two vertically integrated firms consider supplying an unintegrated distributor additional strategic
effects are present which tend to increase the likelihood of complete foreclosure. If one integrated operator
were to supply the unintegrated distributor then (since prices are strategic complements) the integrated rival
would react by cutting its retail price: this effect may be sufficient to overturn the no-foreclosure result. See
Hombert et al. (2010, Section 6.2) for an analysis of this situation.
6 This article (in working paper form) is cited in the Ofcom Pay TV investigation and Competition
Commission Movies on Pay TV investigation, and discussed in submissions by interested parties. It is also
mentioned in Autorite de la concurrence (2009).
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analyse contractual arrangements and competition in payTVwith particular reference to
the UK industry. Stennek (2014) assesses the implications of exclusive distribution for
investment in programme quality. Hagiu and Lee (2011) examine links between
exclusivity and control over retail pricing in a setting where content providers and
distributors are vertically separated.
Both Armstrong (1999) and Harbord and Ottaviani (2001) find that, when per-
subscriber fees may be used, non-exclusivity is the unique outcome. This no-
foreclosure result for a single upstream firm is echoed in a more general setting by
Hombert et al. (2010, Section 6.1) and Madden and Pezzino (2013, Section 3.3).
Hombert et al. (2010) explain that complete foreclosure never arises as long as the
downstream firm is not too inefficient; Madden and Pezzino note that their foreclosure
impossibility result survives even if retail market competition is arbitrarily close to
perfect competition. Overturning this no-foreclosure result in a differentiated goods
setting with equally efficient distributors is the contribution of this article.
The no-foreclosure result can be understood by reference to the literature on patent
licensing: see Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Kamien and Tauman (1986), Jehiel et al.
(1996), Segal (1999) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000). This literature teaches us that,
given sufficient instruments, the licensor chooses the efficient allocation. In Katz and
Shapiro (1985), the holder of a cost-reducing innovation chooses whether or not to
license this to a downstream rival; when a per-unit charge can be used there is always a
licensing agreement which is preferred by both firms to the no-licensing alternative.
While existing literature cannot adequately explain foreclosure by a single upstream
supplier, several articles find foreclosure may arise with two or more upstream suppliers:
see Salinger (1988), Hart and Tirole (1990), Ordover et al. (1990), Riordan (1998), Choi
and Yi (2000), Chen (2001), Chen and Riordan (2007), Ordover and Shaffer (2007),
Hombert et al. (2010) and Bourreau et al. (2011); see also the surveys by Rey and Tirole
(2007) and Riordan (2008). In an empirical study of competing platforms, Lee (2013)
examines the impact of exclusive software in the US videogame industry.
The model of pay TV competition adopted in this article follows the Hotelling-based
approach established by Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002, 2004), Dukes and Gal-Or (2003),
Gal-Or and Dukes (2003), Anderson and Coate (2005) and Peitz and Valletti (2008).
These contributions examine a number of issues including content differentiation,
advertising intensity and comparisons of welfare under pay TV and free-to-air (adver-
tising financed) television. However, none of these articles considers content exclusivity.
The article is organised as follows. Section 1 sets out a static benchmark model to
examine incentives of a vertically integrated operator to supply its premium content to
a rival distributor. Section 2 extends the framework to incorporate a switching cost and
examines how this dynamic feature affects incentives towards exclusivity. Section 3
explores other dynamic mechanisms – platform investment and exclusion –
highlighting the important features that generate an incentive for exclusivity. Welfare
implications are assessed for the various models. Section 4 draws on the findings to
explain empirical observations of exclusivity in pay TV and discusses implications for
policy towards content distribution. Section 5 concludes. There are three Appendices:
Appendix A presents an alternative Bertrand model supporting the non-exclusivity
result of Section 1; Appendices B and C provide further details of the models in
Sections 2 and 3 respectively.
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1. Static Benchmark
This Section sets out a static benchmark model to investigate incentives of a vertically
integrated pay TV operator to supply its premium content to a rival distributor. The
analysis is further supported by the alternative Bertrand framework presented in
Appendix A.
The integrated firm operates at two stages of the pay TV industry. It produces
premium content (which, depending on one’s country, may be variously termed a
television channel, programme service or network) containing programming that is
highly attractive to viewers, such as live coverage of popular sports or recent Hollywood
movies. It distributes this premium content, together with other (‘basic’) programming
and possibly other (e.g. telecoms) services, to its own retail consumers. It may also, if it
wishes, wholesale its premium content to the rival distributor; i.e. it chooses between
exclusive and non-exclusive distribution. The premium content is assumed to be
produced by the integrated firm7 and has no substitutes, thus the rival distributor
cannot create or acquire equally attractive programming from elsewhere. As channel
producer, the integrated firm may also sell advertising airtime on the premium
channel. If it chooses non-exclusive distribution then, in addition to its own retail
revenues, the integrated firm receives wholesale fees from the rival distributor, while its
advertising revenues are proportional to the combined audience.
The distributors are assumed to be horizontally differentiated. In pay TV, horizontal
differentiation arises from differences in distribution technology (e.g. cable, satellite,
IPTV), basic programming (e.g. general entertainment, news, documentaries, dramas)
and/or bundled services (e.g. telephony, broadband) offered by the two distributors.
Horizontal differentiation implies that the rival distributor serves consumers that the
integrated firm finds it difficult to reach; in other words, non-exclusive distribution
offers the possibility of demand expansion.
1.1. The Model
Following Anderson and Coate (2005) and others, competition in the pay TV industry
is modelled as follows. There are two distributors, i = A, B, which provide television
channels to a population of consumers (viewers). Consumers regard the products of
the two distributors as horizontally differentiated. Following Hotelling (1929),
consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, while distributors’ locations
are fixed at each end of the line.8 The utility provided by product i is denoted ui. The
consumer located at x 2 [0, 1] obtains net utility of uA  tx if she buys from A and
uB  t(1  x) if she buys from B, with transport cost t > 0. The marginal cost of
supplying a consumer is zero.9
7 Channel production may incorporate externally-produced programming (e.g. Hollywood movies) or
require televisation rights to be obtained from third parties (e.g. sports leagues). The upstream stage of
contracting with rights holders is ignored here but is explored elsewhere: see Weeds (2014).
8 For a discussion of channel supply in alternative oligopoly models see Harbord and Ottaviani (2001,
Section 3.3.1). Appendix A to this article considers the Bertrand model.
9 Little in the analysis is altered if there is a distribution cost per viewer. It is assumed that any fixed costs
are sufficiently small that both distributors continue to operate.
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Utility ui is given by ui = vi  pi, where vi represents the quality of i’s content
(taking account of disutility from any advertising carried) and pi is the subscription
charge. Quality vi is made up of two components: basic channels, collectively of
quality v0, and – if the distributor has access to this – premium content v. The
premium content is produced by distributor A which supplies this to its own
subscribers. If it chooses, A may also wholesale its premium content to B; the
question of whether this supply takes place – i.e. whether non-exclusive or exclusive
distribution is chosen – is the subject of this article. It is assumed that the
distributors are symmetric ex ante in the sense that v0 is identical; v0 is assumed to
be sufficiently large for the market always to be covered. Thus, the relative quality of
the two distributors’ products depends crucially upon whether A chooses exclusive
or non-exclusive distribution.
The game takes place as follows. At the start, A chooses whether or not to supply its
premium content to B. If it chooses to do so, A offers the premium content to B in
return for a per-subscriber fee, c;10Bmay either accept or reject the offer.11 Distributors
then compete in the retail market, simultaneously choosing prices. As channel
producer A also earns advertising revenues of r per viewer of the premium content
(regardless of distributor).12
While providing a tractable framework for analysis and further extensions, the
model presented in this subsection has a number of restrictive features. The
assumptions of full coverage, preference structure and efficient contracting
ensure that under non-exclusive distribution the integrated operator can extract
all surplus from both the rival distributor and consumers. To address the potential
concern that the finding of this subsection might be driven by these features,
undermining its robustness, Appendix A presents an alternative framework based on
Bertrand duopoly in differentiated goods which relaxes these restrictions. This
alternative analysis demonstrates that, even with downward-sloping demand, incom-
plete coverage and inefficient contracting, the finding that in static analysis the
integrated operator always chooses non-exclusive distribution, which continues to
hold.
1.2. Analysis
The analysis proceeds as follows. First, retail market outcomes are derived assuming
exclusivity and non-exclusivity respectively. Then A’s choice of supply arrangement is
determined by comparing its profits under the two scenarios.
When A supplies the premium content exclusively to its own consumers, equilibrium
prices and profits are:
10 The analysis can alternatively be carried out using a two-part tariff: this allows A to extract additional
surplus from B but the findings are qualitatively unchanged.
11 It is assumed that the integrated operator has all the bargaining power in negotiations. While this is
convenient and realistic in this setting, alternative approaches could be used. Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2012) estimate bargaining parameters in the US pay TV sector.
12 If, instead, advertising airtime is sold by the distributor, outcomes are unchanged: regarding its own
subscribers it makes no difference whether A receives advertising revenues as producer or distributor, while
(under non-exclusivity) advertising revenues received by B are passed to A via the wholesale fee.
© 2014 The Authors.
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pexclA ¼t þ
1
3
ðv  2r Þ; pexclB ¼ t 
1
3
ðv þ r Þ;
pexclA ¼
1
18t
ð3t þ v þ rÞ2; pexclB ¼
1
18t
ð3t  v  r Þ2:
(1)
Distributor A gains a larger market share than its rival, with
sexclA ¼
1
2
þ 1
6t
ðv þ r Þ:
For the market to remain competitive the following condition is required and is
assumed henceforth:
3t  v þ r : (2)
The condition requires distributors to be sufficiently differentiated, relative to the
attractiveness of premium content, that under exclusivity the distributor without
premium content continues to supply some consumers.13
When A supplies its premium content to B, charging a per-subscriber fee c,
equilibrium prices are symmetric at pne = t + c and market shares are one-half each.
Profits are then
pneA ¼
1
2
t þ c þ r ; pneB ¼
1
2
t:
Note that the per-subscriber fee c is passed on in full to consumers, thus B’s profit is
independent of c. Since pneA is strictly increasing in c, A would like to raise c as high as
possible. It is a dominant strategy for B to accept any contract with a per-subscriber fee
up to v but to reject anything higher than this.14 Thus, A offers and B accepts a contract
with per-subscriber fee equal to v. Equilibrium retail prices for each are then
pne = t + v and A’s profit is
pneA ¼
1
2
t þ v þ r : (3)
From (1) and (3), A’s gain from exclusivity as compared with non-exclusivity,
G0  pexclA  pneA , is given by
G0 ¼  1
18t
ðv þ rÞð12t  v  rÞ\0: (4)
Thus, A finds exclusivity less profitable than non-exclusivity. This gives us the first
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1 (Static equilibrium). In the static model, the vertically integrated pay TV
distributor with premium content always chooses to supply this content to the rival distributor.
13 The ‘competitiveness’ condition is imposed for convenience only: if it were relaxed, an outcome may
arise in which A supplies the entire market, requiring the analysis to be extended to corner solutions, but the
main insights of the model would go through.
14 If c > v, B would make higher profit by refusing to purchase the premium content from A and instead
cutting its price by v. It is assumed that A cannot contractually require carriage and specify retail prices
(resale price maintenance is illegal in most antitrust jurisdictions). Otherwise, it might be possible to use such
a contract to raise retail prices collusively, extracting part or all of v0 from consumers. This would also require
a lump sum payment to compensate B (e.g. a two-part tariff with a negative fixed term F).
© 2014 The Authors.
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Compared with non-exclusivity, exclusivity imposes two opportunity costs on
integrated operator A: forgone wholesale fees from B and smaller advertising revenues
due to reduced audience reach. The analysis shows that these costs exceed A’s benefit
from exclusive distribution of its premium content, which gives it a larger retail market
share and higher retail price. The result holds even in the absence of advertising
revenues (i.e. when r = 0); with advertising, it is even stronger. Thus, in the static
benchmark, it is never rational for the integrated operator to withhold its premium
content from the rival distributor.
It can readily be shown that G0 is decreasing in its three arguments, t, v and r.
Intuitively, the comparative static results can be explained as follows.
 With greater horizontal differentiation, A finds it harder to win subscribers
from its rival, reducing its ability to replace forgone wholesale business with
direct retail sales.
 For more valuable content, the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees is
higher.
 Greater advertising revenue per viewer raises the opportunity cost of reduced
reach.
Defined as the (unweighted) sum of consumer and producer surplus, social welfare
under non-exclusivity is given by W ne0 ¼ v0 þ v þ r  t=4. Welfare is higher under
non-exclusive than exclusive distribution by an amount15
DW0 ¼ 1
36t
ðv þ rÞ½18t  5ðv þ r Þ[ 0:
This outcome can be explained intuitively as follows. Non-exclusivity is allocatively
efficient in two distinct ways: all consumers with positive willingness to pay receive
the premium content regardless of their choice of distributor16 and, since each
consumer chooses the closest distributor, transport costs are minimised. However,
the benefit of non-exclusivity to consumers is limited because the per-subscriber
fee sets a floor beneath retail prices: despite the appearance of retail competition,
the supply of premium content is effectively monopolised. In fact, consumers
would be better off under exclusivity – despite allocative inefficiency – as
they would then benefit from stronger price competition. Compared with
exclusivity, consumer surplus is lower under non-exclusivity with the difference
given by17
15 Welfare results are sensitive to the assumption that firms are initially symmetric. Allowing for asymmetric
firms, Harbord and Ottaviani (2001) find non-exclusivity to be welfare-improving provided that differences in
initial programming v0 are not too large.
16 Although in the Hotelling model, the market is ‘covered’ in that all consumers purchase at least a basic
product, under exclusivity only a subset of consumers receive the premium content whereas under non-
exclusivity all consumers receive premium content.
17 This finding may be sensitive to the modelling approach used in this subsection, in which it is
straightforward for the integrated firm to extract consumer surplus using per-subscriber fees. With
downward-sloping demand for premium content, consumers would retain some surplus and this finding
might be qualified.
© 2014 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
1608 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ A U G U S T
DCS0 ¼  1
36t
v þ rð Þ 18t þ v þ rð Þ\0:
1.3. Discussion
The clear-cut preference for non-exclusivity found in this Section, and further
supported by the Bertrand model in Appendix A, is underpinned by two features of
the model. The first is the scope for non-exclusive distribution to expand demand
for the premium content, arising from product differentiation between the
distributors. If the rival distributor merely diverted consumers from the integrated
firm with no accompanying expansion in demand, then there would be little
incentive to engage in wholesale supply. It should be noted that the terms of
wholesale supply are endogenous: whatever contracting approach is used, it is
reasonable to expect the terms of supply to adjust so that potential gains from trade
are realised. Accordingly, the integrated operator can always find a wholesale
contract which makes it more profitable to supply the rival distributor than to
foreclose it.18 The Hotelling model in this Section facilitates efficient contracting
but the result is not dependent on this structure: in the Bertrand model in
Appendix A, contracting is not efficient (double marginalisation exists) yet the
same non-exclusivity result is found.
The second feature supporting the non-exclusivity result is the per-subscriber
wholesale fee.19 Commonly used in wholesale supply of television channels,20 a per-
subscriber fee has two implications. For the rival distributor, the per-subscriber fee
represents a marginal cost of supplying an additional consumer. For the integrated
operator, the fee creates an opportunity cost of winning subscribers from the rival
distributor. The result is a softening of retail price competition, which allows the
integrated firm to supply its rival and extract surplus from additional consumers
while limiting retail competition that would otherwise undermine the value of its
premium content. In the Hotelling framework of this Section, the per-subscriber fee
is sufficient to achieve the efficient allocation: all consumers receive the premium
content and transport costs are minimised. This result accords with the wider
literature on contracting in the presence of externalities (see, inter alia, Segal,
1999): provided sufficient instruments are available, the seller chooses the efficient
allocation.
The analysis in this Section might be seen as a basis for regulation to reduce
wholesale channel fees: this would reduce retail prices for premium content,
18 As Madden and Pezzino comment on their foreclosure impossibility result: ‘[p]rovided the retailed
goods are imperfect substitutes to some degree, the owner of the essential facility will always find a wholesale
offer that provides enough wholesale revenue to compensate for any loss of retail market share’ (Madden and
Pezzino, 2013, p. 12).
19 When wholesale contracting involves lump-sum payments only, Armstrong (1999) and Weeds (2014)
show that exclusivity may instead arise. In Stennek (2014), the restriction to lump-sum payments similarly
biases the analysis towards exclusivity.
20 Per-subscriber fees are the norm in the wholesale supply of television channels. In practice, wholesale
contracts may be more complex than the simple linear structure assumed here, incorporating minimum
payments and/or discounts related to the proportion of the distributor’s basic channel subscribers that are
served: see Office of Fair Trading (2002) for a description of BSkyB’s wholesale contracts.
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increasing benefits to consumers. However, such regulation may undermine
wholesale supply: if the fee were regulated at too low a level, the integrated firm
may prefer not to supply at all; then to overcome foreclosure, the regulation would
need to be accompanied by an obligation to supply. It should also be noted that, by
reducing the content provider’s revenues, wholesale regulation might weaken
incentives for investment in programme production and quality, potentially harming
consumers.
Notice that the terms v and r often appear together in the profit expressions above.
Advertising revenue r is equivalent to a reduction in the seller’s (net) marginal cost.
There are strong similarities between a quality-raising input and a cost-reducing
technology: it is unsurprising therefore that the terms appear together in this analysis.
In the rest of the article, the somewhat redundant term r is dropped.
The analysis of this Section, together with Appendix A, presents us with a puzzle: the
findings suggest that premium content will always be distributed non-exclusively, yet in
several instances exclusive distribution is observed. How can this be explained? While it
is possible that wholesale supply negotiations may occasionally break down, exclusive
distribution seems too prolonged and the pattern too consistent for this to be the
primary explanation. Rather there would seem to be an additional factor not captured
by the static analysis: potential future benefits from capturing retail market share from
a competitor. The next Section examines the impact of dynamic aspects to competition
on incentives for content distribution.
2. Platform Competition with Switching Costs
The model of Section 1 is now extended by adding a dynamic dimension to
competition between distributors. This Section considers the impact of platform
switching costs. The next Section outlines some alternative mechanisms, highlighting
the general features that must be present for there to be a dynamic incentive for
exclusivity.
When a consumer subscribes to pay TV, a set-up cost is incurred by the provider
and/or consumer: this includes the purchase and installation of reception equipment,
decoders, wiring, etc. If the consumer subsequently decides to switch to another
provider, a further installation cost is incurred, as well as the time and inconvenience
involved in switching. The cost is typically larger when the consumer switches to a
different distribution technology (e.g. from cable to satellite) but there are also costs of
switching between providers using similar technologies. Empirical estimates suggest
that switching costs in pay TV are significant, equalling one-third to one-half of the
annual bill (Shcherbakov, 2013).
Switching costs create a demand-side economy of scale between successive purchases
from the same supplier. As a result consumers become ‘sticky’, tending to remain with
the same provider even when the offer that initially attracted them has expired and the
comparison with other distributors is no longer favourable. The extensive literature on
switching costs, surveyed by Farrell and Klemperer (2007), teaches that in growing
markets with many new consumers there is a strong incentive to compete fiercely to
attract subscribers. Once consumers are locked in, however, switching costs can be
exploited to extract additional consumer surplus.
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Switching costs are typically modelled using a two-period model. At the start of the
first period, consumers are unattached and suppliers compete to sign them up; then, at
the start of the second period, consumers are locked in and competition is softened by
the presence of switching costs. In the following, the static framework of Section 1 is
extended into a two-period model with switching costs to assess the incentive for
content exclusivity in their presence.
2.1. The Model with Switching Costs
Competition takes place for two periods. In the first period, all consumers are new to
the market, each subscribing to the distributor that offers the highest utility after
transport costs. Distributors are unable to make binding commitments regarding
future prices. In period 2, distributors compete again but consumers now face
switching costs:21 a consumer that wishes to switch providers incurs a cost r 2 [0, t).22
It is assumed that the distributors can price discriminate between their own and their
rival’s installed base of consumers. There may be an initial asymmetry between the
distributors: the underlying quality of each distributor, distinct from premium content,
is vi0 (i = A, B). Define vD  vA0  vB0; it is assumed that vD ≥ 0. The competitive
market condition is
t þ r vD þ v:
This condition, like (2) above, requires distributors to be sufficiently differentiated,
given the attractiveness of premium content, that under exclusivity the distributor
without premium content continues to supply some consumers.23
As before, distributor A is vertically integrated with premium content (a channel,
programme service or network) of quality v. At the start of each period, A chooses
whether or not to supply its premium content to rival distributor B. Contracting takes
place as described in Section 1 above. Contracts last for a single period, thus an
agreement for wholesale supply in period 1 does not guarantee that wholesale supply
will be offered in period 2 (and, similarly, non-supply in period 1 does not preclude
wholesale supply in period 2). Advertising revenue is ignored. For tractability it is
assumed that there is no discounting of future profits. Details of the analysis are
provided in Appendix B.
In period 2, A always chooses to supply its premium content to the rival distributor
(see Appendix B). The intuition follows from Section 1: with no further rounds the
situation is static, thus non-exclusivity is chosen. Period 2 profits for A and B
respectively are given by:
21 The incidence of switching costs is irrelevant: the same analysis would apply if distributors chose to
subsidise this cost.
22 The upper bound on r ensures that switching costs do not completely eliminate competition in period 2
(the consumer located at position 1 would potentially switch from A to B if both offered premium content at
the same price). As noted in footnote 13, the condition is imposed for convenience so that interior solutions
may be used but it could be relaxed.
23 Again, the condition is imposed to simplify the analysis by reducing the incidence of corner solutions,
but could be relaxed.
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pne2A ¼
1
18t
t þ vD þ rþ 2tsAð Þ2þ 1
18t
3t þ vD  r 4tsAð Þ2þv;
pne2B ¼
1
18t
t þ vD þ r 4tsAð Þ2þ 1
18t
3t  vD þ r 2tsAð Þ2;
(5)
where sA is A’s period 1 market share. Combined industry profit in period
2 (pne2A þ pne2B ) is convex in period 1 market share sA, reaching its minimum at
sA = [(1/2) + vD]/(10t) and increasing as shares become more asymmetric.
Firm A’s gain from exclusivity compared with non-exclusivity in period 1, given
optimal period 2 behaviour, is given by the following expression (the derivation is
provided in Appendix B)
Gr ¼ v
49t
ð18v þ 20vD  21tÞ: (6)
Proposition 2 describes incentives for exclusivity in the presence of switching costs,
showing that exclusivity is more likely for more valuable content and when distributors
are less differentiated. Note also that if future profits were discounted, then the
incentive for exclusivity would be increasing in the weight put on future profits, as
there is profit sacrifice in period 1 in return for a gain in period 2.
PROPOSITION 2 (Exclusivity with switching costs). The vertically integrated pay TV
distributor with premium content chooses exclusivity in period 1 iff t < (6/7)v + (20/21)v. This
condition implies that exclusivity is chosen under the following circumstances:
(a) For v [ max v^r; 0f g where v^r  ð7=6Þt  ð20=18ÞvD. If t ≤ (20/21)v, exclusivity
is chosen for all v.
(b) For sufficiently small t.
Proof. Gr(v) > 0 requires 18v + 20vD  21 > 0. This is satisfied for v > (7/6)t
 (20/18)vD. If t ≤ (20/21)vD then the condition is always satisfied.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows combinations of t and v
generating each outcome.
The roles of the two parameters can be understood as follows.
 Little horizontal differentiation. With smaller t consumers are easier to attract
in competition with the rival distributor, raising the integrated firm’s
period 1 market share. This has two implications for its revenues, both of
which encourage exclusivity. First, as demonstrated in Section 1, the
opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees under exclusivity in period 1 is
reduced. Secondly, the higher period 1 market share confers a larger
benefit in period 2.
 Valuable content. There are two conflicting effects of higher v. As Section 1
shows, the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees under exclusivity is
increasing in v. But, with larger v, the integrated firm’s period 1 market share
under exclusivity is higher, increasing its future benefit. For less valuable
content, the first effect dominates and non-exclusivity is preferred but, for
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highly attractive content, the dynamic effect dominates and exclusivity is
chosen.
With exclusivity consumers benefit from lower prices in period 1 but lose out from
weaker competition in period 2, as is commonly found in models with switching costs.
Comparing consumer surplus under non-exclusivity and exclusivity in period 1 (period
2 is always non-exclusive), taking account of switching costs incurred in period 2,24 the
difference is given by
DCSr ¼  v
98t
49t  18v  27vDð Þ:
Thus exclusivity is the consumer optimum iff t > (18v + 27vD)/49. Consumers are
more likely to prefer exclusivity for small v and for large t, the opposite of the
integrated firm’s preference.
Comparing total welfare under non-exclusivity and exclusivity, the difference is given
by
DWr ¼ v
98t
49t  54v  53vDð Þ:
Exclusivity is socially preferred iff t < (54v + 53vD)/49. Comparing this with the private
optimum in Proposition 2, it can be seen that the social planner chooses exclusivity
0.0
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v
t
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Non-exclusivity
Fig. 1. Exclusivity with Switching Costs
Note. Parameter values used in the Figure are r = 0.2 and vD = 3.
24 Total switching costs incurred in period 2 are the same regardless of whether exclusivity or non-
exclusivity is chosen in period 1.
© 2014 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2016] T V W A R S 1613
more often than the integrated firm. This somewhat surprising result occurs for the
following reason. Since firms can price discriminate between new and existing
consumers, there is allocative inefficiency in period 2 – despite non-exclusive
distribution – because each distributor supplies some consumers whose preference
(at equal prices) is for their rival, incurring unnecessary transport costs. With greater
asymmetry in period 1 market shares, more consumers purchase from their preferred
distributor in period 2 and this inefficiency is reduced. This effect can outweigh the
allocative efficiency losses in period 1, making exclusivity socially desirable. (However,
this result may be sensitive to modelling choices, in particular the price discrimination
assumption.)
2.2. Discussion
The finding that exclusivity may be chosen in the initial, ‘sowing’ phase of market
developmentwhen consumers areunattached stems from the trade-off between the static
net revenue gain from supplying the rival distributor (demonstrated in Section 1) and
the future benefit from building market share. In the presence of switching costs, a
higher market share today results in both a higher share and a higher price tomorrow,
generating a convex relationship between current market share and future profit as
observed following the profit expressions (5). A convex relationship is commonplace in
the switching costs literature: for example, Beggs andKlemperer (1992) find that a firm’s
future value is quadratic in its current share. Convexity implies that the marginal benefit
to building market share is increasing in the distributor’s share. Thus, any initial
advantage which generates asymmetric market shares is amplified: the larger distribu-
tor’s incentive to build market shares become stronger while that of its rival weakens.
Exclusive content plays a crucial role in creating the initial asymmetry. Price
competition alone cannot achieve this: when the distributors carry equally attractive
content equilibrium market shares are equal. Note that in broadcasting, where the
marginal cost of supplying an additional consumer is negligible, a competitive
advantage cannot be achieved through cost-reducing innovation. Exclusive content is
therefore the main instrument of dynamic competition. This analysis casts light on the
importance of premium content in pay TV: this programming’s particular attractive-
ness to viewers makes exclusivity an effective competitive strategy.
Rather than violating the principle in the contracting literature that, provided
sufficient instruments are available, the content holder chooses the efficient allocation,
the result is an instance of this. The holder implements the allocation which maximises
industry profits but now in a dynamic rather than purely static setting. Although there
is a loss of allocative efficiency, as some consumers with positive willingness to pay do
not receive the premium content and transport costs are not minimised, the
asymmetry generated by exclusive content nonetheless raises profits overall. If an
alternative mechanism could be found to induce asymmetry, non-exclusive distribution
would improve allocative efficiency in that all consumers would receive premium
content (although transport costs would still be above the minimum). But price
competition alone cannot generate asymmetry and a market-sharing agreement would
fall foul of antitrust authorities – hence the unique role of exclusive premium content.
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This analysis demonstrates that, for a dynamic incentive for exclusivity to exist, two
features must be present. There must be an intertemporal linkage between period 1
market share and period 2 profit; or, to put it more generally, a mechanism by which a
higher market share has persistent effects. Secondly, there must be some form of scale
effect such that greater asymmetry of market shares raises total industry profit, not just
shifts profits from one firm to another. A switching cost creates both intertemporal
linkage and a scale effect. The next Section briefly outlines two other mechanisms that
may generate exclusivity: in each case the two necessary features of intertemporal
linkage and a scale effect are present.
Switching costs have been analysed here using a two-period model in which all
consumers are ‘new’ in period 1 and become ‘old’ in period 2. This framework could
be extended in several ways. In a multi-period model exclusivity might be sustained for
many periods, for as long as the future benefit from larger retail share exceeds the
current benefit from wholesale supply: this could produce longer periods of exclusivity,
as seen in pay TV in several countries. Alternatively, one could model a situation in
which new consumers join the market every period and are served simultaneously with
existing consumers: while distributors may be able to discriminate on price between
the two groups, the integrated firm’s choice of exclusivity (or not) would apply to both
new and existing subscribers. This would raise the opportunity cost of exclusivity, as
there would be forgone surplus from existing consumers as well as new ones, but
exclusivity may nonetheless be chosen if the ratio of new to existing subscribers is
sufficiently high.
In the model premium content is controlled by one of the distributors. This feature
is convenient but not essential to the analysis. Similar outcomes might in principle be
expected in the absence of vertical integration:25 given sufficient instruments –
specifically the ability to set appropriate per-subscriber wholesale fees – an indepen-
dent content provider would choose the same allocation as the integrated firm.
Commitment power would also be needed, either to guarantee exclusivity or to assure
a distributor that its rivals will not receive preferential terms.26 There is one difference,
however, between the integrated and non-integrated cases: with vertical integration the
wholesale fee charged to the rival distributor determines the integrated firm’s
opportunity cost of winning subscribers from its competitor at the retail level,27 making
wholesale supply an all-or-nothing decision. By contrast, an independent content
provider could set different wholesale fees to different distributors, varying each one’s
incentive to compete for subscribers, allowing it to create precisely the desired degree
of asymmetry via partial rather than full foreclosure. With vertical integration, this
degree of control is not possible: interestingly, content supply is a blunter instrument
under vertical integration than separation.
25 As Armstrong (1999) and Weeds (2014) show in settings with fixed fee payments, an independent
content provider may choose to contract exclusively with one distributor.
26 Such commitments are feasible in the television industry: exclusivity can be specified in wholesale
contracts, and most favoured nation clauses or a common wholesale ratecard can be used to facilitate non-
discrimination.
27 The precise relationship between the wholesale fee and opportunity cost of winning subscribers follows
from the mode of retail competition. In the Hotelling model, where diversion is one-for-one, the two are
equal.
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3. Other Dynamic Mechanisms
This Section explores other possible dynamic mechanisms which may create an
incentive for exclusive distribution of television content. In common with Section 2,
these models display the two necessary features noted above: intertemporal linkage
and a scale effect such that greater asymmetry increases industry profit.
3.1. Platform Investment
The attractiveness of a television service depends not only on the programming that is
provided but also on the quality of the distribution platform. This may be improved
through platform investment, for example, to expand distribution capacity or to
facilitate high-definition and interactive services. Platform investment is typically a
fixed cost – once this is incurred the improved service may be provided to many
consumers at no additional cost – generating scale economies. Note that platform
investment is investor-specific: unlike investment in programming, its benefit is not
easily transferable to other distributors.
Platform investment is modelled as a dynamic game as follows. In the first stage the
vertically integrated distributor A chooses whether to supply its premium content v to
B, with contracting assumptions as before. In the second stage each distributor i = A, B
may invest in platform quality, qi. In the third stage the distributors compete for
consumers, choosing prices pi, and consumers make subscription decisions. Consumer
utility is given by ui = vi + qi  pi. Fixed costs depend on the level of quality chosen
according to the convex function cq2i =2, where c > 0. The competitive market
condition is28
3t  v þ 2
3c
:
This condition can be regarded as an extension of (2): note that it converges to that
condition in the limit as c?∞ and platform quality becomes fixed.
Detailed analysis is provided in Appendix C. Firm A’s gain from exclusivity
(compared with non-exclusivity) is given by
Gq ¼ c 9tc 1ð Þ
2 9tc 2ð Þ2 v
2  18tc 5ð Þ
3 9tc 2ð Þ v: (7)
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the integrated firm prefers exclusivity for more
attractive content, less differentiated distributors and greater variability in platform
quality.
PROPOSITION 3 (Exclusivity with endogenous platform quality). The vertically integrated
pay TV distributor with premium content chooses exclusivity under the following circumstances:
(a) For v [ max v^q ; 0
 
where v^q ¼ 2 9tc 2ð Þ 18tc 5ð Þ=½3c 9tc 1ð Þ. If
18tc  5 < 0 then exclusivity is chosen for all v.
28 Concavity of profit functions requires 9tc  1 > 0, while the competitive market condition further
requires 9tc  2 ≥ 3vc > 0.
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(b) For sufficiently small t.
(c) For sufficiently small c.
Proof. The Proposition follows from the properties of Gq(v).
(a) (i) If (18tc  5) ≤ 0, Gq(v) is positive for all v > 0.
(ii) Otherwise, for (18tc  5) > 0, Gq(v) = 0 has two roots, 0 and
v^q ¼ ð2=3cÞ½ 9tc 2ð Þ 18tc 5ð Þ= 9tc 1ð Þ [ 0. For v = 0, dGq/dv < 0.
d2Gq/dv
2 = c[(9tc1)/(9tc2)2] > 0. Thus Gq > 0 for v [ v^q .
(b) dGq/dc < 0, and at (18tc  5) = 0, Gq > 0.
(c) dGq/dt < 0, and at (18tc  5) = 0, Gq > 0.
Proposition 3 reveals a third factor promoting exclusivity: the strength of the
dynamic factor. When raising platform quality is less costly (i.e. c is lower) asymmetry in
market shares has a greater impact on platform investment and the dynamic incentive
for exclusivity is stronger.
Comparing consumer surplus under non-exclusivity and exclusivity, the difference is
given by
DCSq ¼  1
2
v  9tc
2
4 9tc 2ð Þ2 v
2\0:
Hence consumers as a whole are better off under exclusivity, regardless of the cost of
quality. However, while A’s consumers always benefit (uexclA [ u
ne
A ), depending on
parameter values B’s consumers may be better or worse off under exclusivity (i.e. it is
possible that uexclB \ u
ne
B ). As well as having no access to premium content, B’s
consumers suffer from lower platform quality under exclusivity, though they pay a
lower price.
Comparing total welfare under non-exclusivity and exclusivity, the difference is given
by
DWq ¼ 1
2
v  c 45tc 4ð Þ
4 9tc 2ð Þ2 v
2:
Defining
vq  2 9tc 2ð Þ
2
c 45tc 4ð Þ ;
non-exclusivity (exclusivity) is socially preferred for v\ ð [ Þvq . The comparison of
social and private thresholds, vq and bvq , is ambiguous: the private operator may choose
exclusivity too infrequently or too often compared with the social planner. As with the
private optimum, the planner is more likely to choose exclusivity when distributors are
less differentiated and quality is more variable.
3.1.1. Discussion
The desirability of exclusivity, for both the integrated distributor and the social
planner, arises from economies of scale in platform investment. Fixed investment costs
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imply that quality can be provided more efficiently when consumers are served by the
same distributor, with the result that industry profit is higher when market shares are
asymmetric. Together with the persistence of platform investments – once investment
is sunk at stage 2 it cannot be costlessly undone at stage 3 – the two features
highlighted in Section 2 are present, generating a dynamic incentive for exclusivity.
3.2. Exclusion
In some circumstances a distributor may be able to exclude a rival by driving down the
latter’s profit, especially in the presence of significant fixed costs. In this setting
content exclusivity may be used as an exclusionary strategy, as in the following simple
extension of the static framework of Section 1.
At the start of period 1, integrated distributor A chooses whether or not to supply its
premium content v to rival distributor B, with contracting assumptions as before. The
firms then compete in prices. Suppose that if B’s profit is reduced below a critical
threshold E for one period it then exits the market; the exit threshold depends on B’s
fixed costs, financial reserves, ability to raise outside finance, bankruptcy rules, merger
control (if exit is via a distressed merger with A) etc. (This simple approach to
exclusion ignores issues of commitment and credibility.) If B exits, A then becomes a
monopolist in period 2, earning monopoly profit pm + v : this is assumed to exceed its
static duopoly profit of v + t/2. (Note that the supply of premium content is already
monopolised: A extracts its full value v under both static duopoly and monopoly.) It is
assumed that firms cannot commit to low prices but that A can commit to its period 1
contracting choice.
If E > t/2 then an exclusionary strategy is unnecessary: the static equilibrium with
non-exclusive distribution is sufficient to induce exit. Suppose that E < t/2. For
exclusion to be effective requires
pexclB ¼
1
18t
3t  vð Þ2\ E : (8)
Hence exclusivity is more effective as an exclusionary strategy for larger v and smaller t,
as these reduce the rival’s profit. Larger E implies that the target is weaker and hence
easier to exclude.
For A to have an incentive to exclude, its gain from monopoly in period 2 must
exceed its opportunity cost from exclusivity in period 1. Its net gain is given by
GE ¼ pm  1
18t
9t2 þ 12tv  v2 : (9)
This expression is increasing in pm and decreasing in both v and t. With less valuable
content the opportunity cost of forgone wholesale fees is lower, making exclusivity
more attractive. Lower differentiation has two effects: A has more to gain from
monopolisation (the difference between pm and t/2 is larger) and finds exclusion less
costly (it can win customers over its rival more easily).
Putting these results together, exclusion through content exclusivity is both
more effective and more desirable for the predator when firms are less
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differentiated. With highly attractive content the strategy is more effective but also
more costly to the predator. While the model has assumed for simplicity that firms
do not discount future profits, if discounting were incorporated the incentive for
exclusivity would be increasing in the weight put on future profits because (as for
other forms of predation) there is profit sacrifice in period 1 in return for a gain in
period 2.
Regarding welfare, it is natural to assume that consumers are worse off under
monopoly; moreover, even if they benefit from stronger price competition during the
predatory period, subsequent monopolisation is likely to harm them overall. Thus,
competition authorities are likely to regard exclusivity as detrimental when it forms
part of an exclusionary strategy.
3.2.1. Discussion
In the case of exclusion, the incentive for exclusivity arises from its impact on industry
structure: there is a scale effect arising from the loss of competition. The two necessary
features noted above are present: inducing exit in period 1 has persistent effects since
re-entry (or the entry of other firms) in period 2 is taken to be infeasible and, via
monopolisation, asymmetry raises industry profit. This example also distinguishes the
different roles played by v, the value of premium quality: the exclusion strategy is
ineffective unless v is large enough to satisfy expression (8) but thereafter larger v
increases its cost in terms of profit sacrifice in period 1.
4. Empirical and Policy Implications
4.1. Empirical Implications
The analysis in this article explains the observed pattern of exclusivity in pay TV across
many countries (bearing in mind that in some countries the ability to withhold
programming is restricted by must-offer regulations). First, it explains why exclusivity is
observed for premium channels while basic ones are widely distributed: as demon-
strated by the comparative static in Proposition 2, exclusivity is chosen only for more
highly valued programming.
Secondly, it explains why exclusivity tends to be observed in competition between
relatively undifferentiated pay TV distributors, and why less differentiated rivals may be
excluded while more differentiated distributors are supplied. To the extent that
platform type is an important element of horizontal differentiation in the retail
market, this explains the observation of exclusivity within a distribution technology
(e.g. satellite-to-satellite) while distributors using other technologies (e.g. cable) are
supplied. Prior to merger, satellite-based pay TV operators in France (CanalSat and
TPS), Italy (Newscorp and Telepiu) and Spain (Sogecable and Vıa Digital) competed
with exclusive premium content; in Scandinavia, Canal Digital and Viasat continue to
do so. However, in Italy Telepiu supplied its premium channels for distribution to
Newscorp’s cable (but not its satellite) subscribers; similarly in Scandinavia premium
programming is supplied to competing cable, digital terrestrial (airwave) and IPTV-
based distributors.
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While the dynamic features highlighted in Section 2 (switching costs) and subsection
3.1 (scale economies in platform investment) are commonly present in pay TV,
particular circumstances are needed for dynamic effects to be sufficiently strong to
generate exclusivity. As the two-period model in Section 2 highlights, building market
share in the presence of switching costs is important when a large number of potential
consumers are unattached. While in most countries the maturity of the pay TV industry
implies that many consumers already subscribe to incumbent providers, there are times
of transition when new consumers are drawn into the market and subscribers may
make fresh decisions.
The emergence of a new distribution technology – such as IPTV, satellite or
mobile TV – creates such a situation. The switching cost model can explain the use
of exclusive premium content by European telecoms incumbents building IPTV
platforms,29 US satellite operator DirecTV30 and emerging mobile TV services. Note,
however, that since exclusivity is most desirable against rival distributors that: are less
horizontally differentiated; and do not already have an installed subscriber base (as
then the opportunity cost of non-supply is low), exclusive content offered by an IPTV
operator (say) may best be seen as a competitive strategy between IPTV operators
rather than against pay TV incumbents. This is reflected in the concern expressed by
the French Authorite de la concurrence over the ‘double exclusivity’ business model
employed by Orange/France Telecom,31 which tied access to its premium sports and
movie content to a subscription to its ‘triple play’ service of telephony, broadband
and TV, potentially distorting competition in the broadband market (Autorite de la
concurrence, 2009).
The additional dynamic mechanisms described in Section 3 explain other situations
in which exclusivity is observed. Scale economies in investment can explain the
observation of exclusive content at times when the integrated operator and/or its rival
(s) are building distribution platforms or investing in major enhancements (e.g.
digitisation of their platforms). In the US, cable incumbents have exploited the
‘terrestrial exemption’ from wholesale supply regulations32 to deny regional sports
29 Belgium: Belgacom TV distributed live Jupiler Pro League football matches exclusively to its own
broadband subscribers from 2005, until losing exclusive rights in 2011 (the author thanks Christian
Huveneers of the Belgian Competition Authority for this information). France: Orange/France Telecom
launched its premium Orange Sport and Orange Cinema Series channels in 2008 offering these exclusively
to its own broadband subscribers. UK: in 2013 BT launched BT Sport, including 38 exclusive live FA Premier
League football matches, offering this package to its own broadband subscribers at no additional charge
while retailing it to BSkyB’s satellite subscribers for a fee and wholesaling to cable operator Virgin Media.
30 DirecTV entered with its exclusive NFL Sunday Ticket package, against satellite-based rival Dish Network
and entrenched cable incumbents.
31 In 2008 Orange/France Telecom acquired exclusive live rights to French Ligue 1 matches and exclusive
first pay TV window and library rights to movies and TV series from three US studios (Warner Bros, MGM and
HBO), from which it created its premium Orange Sport and Orange Cinema Series channels. Once
established in pay TV the operator changed its content distribution strategy: in 2011 it sold a stake in Orange
Cinema Series to GCP, owner of the incumbent satellite distributor CanalSat – this service is now widely
distributed – and in 2012 it closed Orange Sport.
32 Until 2010 the programme access rules, requiring vertically integrated operators to provide their
programming to other distributors on non-discriminatory terms, did not apply to terrestrially-delivered
content.
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programming to cable overbuilders,33 satellite entrants34 and new fibre-based video
services.35 Here, content exclusivity operates as a strategy to hold back the rival’s
investment. Note that in these cases the opportunity cost of non-supply to a small
entrant is low.
Occasionally exclusion of a rival is feasible. While cable’s assets are largely sunk and
unlikely to leave the market, satellite operators may be more susceptible to predation.
Wars of attrition have taken place between satellite pay TV operators in several
European countries (Spain, Italy, France) and between satellite-based pay-radio
operators in the USA (Sirius and XM), in each case ending in a distressed merger.
Content exclusivity has been a common feature of these wars of attrition, as each
operator attempts to take retail share from its rival and drive the latter from the
market.
When applying the article’s analysis to real-world markets, one issue that arises is the
interpretation of the market share condition in oligopoly markets with more than two
distributors. In such instances, the condition that ‘greater asymmetry in market shares
raises industry profit’ should be interpreted as follows: that raising the market share(s)
of the integrated firm and any other distributor(s) it chooses to supply, and reducing
those of the excluded distributors, increases industry profit. Note that in markets with
more than two distributors, the profit-maximising choice may be to supply some rivals
and exclude others, as observed in several pay TV markets.
4.2. Messages For Policy
The analysis in this article has a number of implications for policy. Although this
discussion refers to pay TV, as noted in the Introduction the article’s messages also
apply to other sectors.
The first message is that for exclusion to occur in a setting where wholesale supply
would expand demand there needs to be a coherent dynamic mechanism. Without
such a mechanism the finding of the static framework in Section 1, supported by the
Bertrand model in Appendix A and other literature, can be expected: an integrated
distributor with premium content will always choose to supply rival distributors. This is
not to say that every potential distributor that requests wholesale supply should
necessarily be served: if doing so would not expand demand then supply would not be
expected to take place. Moreover, the result is predicated on wholesale supply
arrangements being commercially negotiated: if wholesale fees are regulated, perhaps
in an attempt to reduce retail prices, the integrated operator might prefer not to
supply.
33 For example, in Kansas City, Comcast and Time Warner used the terrestrial exemption to withhold
college sports programming from Everest Connections Corp., a small cable entrant. Note that in the US, as
elsewhere, cable overbuilding is rare, thus instances of cable-to-cable exclusivity are uncommon.
34 For example, in Philadelphia, Comcast SportsNet is not available to satellite operators DirecTV and Dish
Network.
35 In San Diego, Cox Communications has withheld access to San Diego Padres games from AT&T’s
U-Verse video service. In New York, Cablevision has barred U-Verse and Verizon’s FiOS video service from
carrying the high-definition format of its Madison Square Garden networks, which televise local sports
matches.
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Secondly, the dynamic mechanism motivating exclusive distribution must be based
on some form of scale effect such that greater asymmetry in market shares raises
industry profit, combined with intertemporal linkage or persistence in effects. In pay
TV, scale economies and persistence typically arise from the characteristics of
distribution platforms: platform investment incurs substantial fixed costs for suppliers
and are largely sunk, while for consumers platform-specific reception equipment
implies a switching cost of changing supplier, especially to one using a different
distribution technology.
Other proposed dynamic mechanisms can be evaluated using the principles outlined
here. In its 2007–10 Pay TV investigation, UK communications regulator Ofcom
focused on a dynamic mechanism linking the acquisition of premium content rights to
retail market shares. Ofcom alleged that BSkyB, as a large, vertically integrated
distributor, had a strategic incentive to restrict wholesale supply of its premium sports
and movie channels to rival distributors in order to prevent the latter from establishing
a strong retail presence which would strengthen their positions when bidding against it
for premium content rights (Ofcom, 2010, para. 7.197). Applying the analysis in this
article, the two necessary features must be present for this mechanism to provide an
incentive for exclusivity. First, there must be persistence in subscription decisions (e.g.
due to switching costs) such that bidders’ prior market shares affect their post-auction
situations; otherwise, interested consumers would immediately switch to the latest
winner of the content rights and pre-auction shares would be irrelevant. Secondly,
content auctions must display a scale effect of the form described here: not only that
larger distributors have an advantage over smaller ones but that greater retail market
share confers increasing marginal benefit. Whether this condition is satisfied is not so
obvious. The value of content rights to a bidder depends on the total audience it can
reach, including via other distributors, not just its own subscribers. If greater surplus
can be extract from one’s own subscribers than from those of other distributors (e.g.
due to vertical inefficiencies or contracting frictions) then a larger distributor may have
a higher valuation of the rights than smaller ones (and independent programme
producers), all else being equal, giving it a higher probability of winning the auction.
However, for there to be an incentive for exclusivity there must be a convex – not
merely linear – relationship between retail market share and profits. This question was
not addressed in the investigation.36
The third message of the article is that welfare implications of exclusive content
distribution are not straightforward. First, exclusivity is not necessarily harmful to
consumers, notwithstanding the loss of allocative efficiency on the part of those
consumers who do not receive the premium content and others who distort their
choice of distributor in order to receive it. When content is widely distributed it is
nonetheless monopolised – despite the appearance of competition – as per-subscriber
fees support high consumer prices. By contrast, exclusivity generates stiffer price
competition which may give greater benefit to consumers. Secondly, depending on the
underlying dynamic mechanism, private and social incentives for exclusivity may be
36 A separate note (available from the author) finds that, in the context of an auction and wholesale
contracting inefficiencies, the effect of distributor size on profit is linear, not convex, implying that this would
not generate an incentive for exclusivity.
© 2014 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
1622 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ A U G U S T
aligned to a greater or lesser degree. If the dynamic incentive arises from economies of
scale in investment or from consumer switching costs, exclusivity may benefit
consumers as well as the integrated firm. However, the respective patterns of
exclusivity may not match precisely: there may be instances where exclusivity is
privately but not socially optimal or vice versa. An obvious divergence between private
and social incentives arises when exclusivity is motivated by exclusion: while the
integrated firm benefits from driving out its rival, one would expect consumers to be
harmed by this. On the other hand, if exclusivity forms part of an entry strategy by a
firm looking to grow its subscriber base consumers may benefit from this in the longer
term.37 Furthermore, impacts on individual consumers may differ: while economies of
scale in platform investment may imply that consumers in aggregate benefit from
exclusivity, consumers with a strong intrinsic preference for the rival distributor’s
product are nonetheless harmed. Given all of this, it is crucial to understand the
dynamic mechanism driving exclusivity and analyse its impacts explicitly, rather than to
characterise exclusivity as harmful per se.
While this article has assumed that the premium content is controlled by one of the
distributors, as noted in Section 2, similar outcomes might in principle be expected in
the absence of vertical integration. If so, vertical separation does not guarantee wide
distribution. In practice, however, vertical integration may play a role in facilitating
exclusivity. In contracts between independent parties, the terms of supply must be fully
specified and be enforceable. While full exclusivity might be relatively straightforward
to implement with a commitment to withhold supply from all other distributors, a
situation in which the content provider wishes to supply some distributors but not
others (e.g. to supply a single operator on each distribution technology) would require
the scope of exclusivity for each to be precisely defined. Furthermore, if dynamic
benefits are realised over a lengthy period then to be effective the exclusive contract
must have a long duration, but this may conflict with the parties’ desire for flexibility,
in case market conditions change over time, as well as inviting scrutiny from
competition authorities.
In practice, regulation of channel supply has tended to focus on the distribution
practices of integrated firms. In the US, the Programme Access Rules (PAR) historically
prohibited vertically integrated distributors from withholding their content from other
distributors.38 While the PAR may have prevented content exclusivity becoming the
major issue it has been in many European countries, programming has occasionally
been withheld from rival distributors (see instances noted in Section 1). Concerns over
wholesale supply were raised in the Comcast/NBC Universal merger: this was cleared
by the Federal Communications Commission in January 2011 subject to a condition
(among others) to ensure that rival distributors continue to have access to Comcast-
NBCU programming.
37 In its assessment of the ‘double exclusivity’ model employed by Orange/France Telecom, the Autorite
de la concurrence noted the potential benefit of entry into the pay TV market facilitated by the strategy, as
well as its potential detriment to broadband competition (Autorite de la concurrence, 2009).
38 The PAR compelled vertically integrated distributors – which include the major cable operators – to
offer satellite-delivered programming in which they have an ownership stake to other distributors on non-
discriminatory terms. The PAR expired in October 2012, being replaced with a case-by-case approach.
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In the model presented here, premium content is a unique collection of highly
attractive programming controlled by the integrated firm. Exclusivity is a powerful
competitive strategy when consumers attach high values to a particular type of
programming (e.g. live sports, first-run movies) and, within this, on a limited number
of outputs (e.g. football/soccer matches played by the national league, blockbuster
movies produced by Hollywood studios). Production of such programming often
requires televisation rights to be acquired from providers further upstream (sports
teams or leagues, movie studios). When there is a limited range of important content
this is relatively easy to monopolise: a sports league selling its rights collectively
naturally prefers to contract with a single buyer as this maximises their value, and even
when potentially competing rights are available – as from the Hollywood majors – these
are often acquired by a single operator (e.g. BSkyB in the UK).
Competition authorities have attempted to intervene further upstream to restrict the
monopolisation of premium content by a single pay TV operator, as a means of
overcoming the potential harmful effects highlighted in this article (which, under-
stood fully, include wide distribution at high retail prices as well as the possible
foreclosure of rival distributors). In Europe, several national football leagues have been
compelled to split their televisation rights into a number of packages, sometimes (as in
the case of the FA Premier League) combined with a no-single-buyer rule ensuring that
more than one pay TV operator acquires premium rights. However, these attempts
have had little success in reducing retail prices or preventing disputes over exclusive
distribution of programming; indeed, avid football fans have criticised such measures
for increasing the total price they must pay to watch all matches. Where certain
premium content confers a strong position and is difficult to break up, the distribution
of programming remains an area of concern to policy makers.
5. Conclusion
This article examines incentives for exclusive distribution of programme content in pay
TV. In settings where wholesale supply would be expected to expand demand,
exclusivity cannot be explained in a purely static setting: there must also be a dynamic
benefit from building market share, resulting from some form of scale effect such that
industry profits are increasing in the asymmetry of market shares. In accordance with
the contracting literature, the content holder chooses the allocation that maximises
industry profit, which, under certain conditions, implies exclusivity. The analysis
explains the observed incidence of exclusive content in pay TV and provides guidance
to policy makers in assessing the scope for, and effects of, content exclusivity.
The importance of exclusive content in pay TV arises in part from the industry’s cost
function, which has a large first-copy cost for programming and significant set-up costs
for distribution systems, after which consumers may be served at minimal incremental
cost. While firms in other industries may compete by reducing their marginal costs, this
is not possible in pay TV as marginal cost is already negligible. Since neither cost
reductions nor price competition (which on its own cannot generate asymmetry) can
play this role, content exclusivity is the primary means by which distributors can
compete for market share. With economies of scale at the platform level, content
exclusivity may become an attractive strategy.
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While this article focuses on pay TV, its relevance extends to many other sectors. The
growth of internet-based and mobile distribution services for music and video may lead
to content exclusively being increasingly used as a competitive strategy online and on
mobile platforms, as it has been in pay TV: the analysis is relevant for these forms of
distribution too. Beyond this, content exclusivity is an important competitive strategy
in any industry where attractive content drives consumer choice. The analysis can
equally be applied to ‘killer apps’ for computer platforms, for example, the Lotus 1-2-3
spreadsheet software for IBM’s PC in the mid-1980s and, more recently, application
software that is specific to a particular mobile phone operating system. It also applies to
popular video games, which are typically exclusive to a particular gaming console, for
example, Space Invaders for the Atari VCS, Sonic the Hedgehog for the Sega Mega
Drive and Super Mario for the Nintendo 64. More generally, input foreclosure may
occur in any sector where a crucial input required for downstream competition is
controlled by one player, for example, the local loop for broadband competition. The
article’s analysis casts light on all of these situations.
Appendix A. Bertrand Model
This Appendix sets out an alternative model for the static analysis in Section 1. The model
presented here, based on Bertrand duopoly in differentiated goods, relaxes the restrictive
features of the Hotelling-based framework: with downward-sloping demand there is incomplete
coverage and, given linear wholesale fees, vertical contracting is inefficient in that double
marginalisation is present.39 This implies that the integrated firm typically fails to extract all
surplus both from consumers and from the rival distributor (under non-exclusive distribution).
Nonetheless, the analysis in this Appendix demonstrates that the static finding that the
integrated operator always chooses to supply the rival distributor holds even under these
conditions.
Two distributors, i = A, B, supply television programming to consumers (viewers). They
compete in prices, adjusted for quality, and their products are horizontally differentiated.
Demand facing distributor i is given by
qi ¼ a b pi  við Þ þ c pj  vj
 
; (A.1)
where a, b, c > 0, b > c and vi denotes the quality of programming supplied by i. The quality of
basic programming (and any bundled retail services) is normalised at 0. A is vertically integrated
with a premium content (a television channel, programme service or network) of quality v which
it supplies to its own retail customers, thus vA = v. If A supplies its premium content to B then
vB = v; otherwise vB = 0. The assumption b > c implies that the demand-expansion effect of
wholesaling the premium content to the rival distributor exceeds the diversion of demand from
the integrated operator. If wholesale supply takes place, A charges B a wholesale fee per
subscriber denoted w. Other than this fee, the marginal cost of supplying a consumer is zero.
Advertising is ignored.
The structure of the game is as follows. In the first period, A decides whether to offer its
premium content to B, specifying if it does so a per-subscriber wholesale fee w. If offered a
39 Alternatively, one could assume that contracting is efficient and producer surplus is divided between the
parties according to the Nash bargaining solution. This approach increases the profits of the contracting
firms and hence is more favourable towards non-exclusivity. By incorporating contracting inefficiency (due to
linear wholesale fees) the approach used in this Appendix is less favourable towards non-exclusivity, thus
strengthening the findings.
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contract B then accepts or rejects this. If a wholesale contract is both offered and accepted, B
supplies the premium content to its consumers; otherwise B supplies basic programming only. In
the second stage, the distributors compete in prices. The following parameter restriction is
required to ensure that prices remain positive and is assumed throughout
v vmax  abc 2bþ cð Þ: (A.2)
In the following analysis, outcomes are derived for exclusive and non-exclusive supply; these are
then compared to assess A’s incentive towards exclusivity.
When A supplies its premium programming exclusively to its own consumers, distributor i’s
profit is given by pi = piqi. Profits under exclusivity are:
pexclA ¼
b
2bþ cð Þ2 2b cð Þ2 a 2bþ cð Þ þ v 2b
2  c2  2; (A.3)
pexclB ¼
b
2bþ cð Þ2 2b cð Þ2 a 2bþ cð Þ  vbc½ 
2: (A.4)
Condition (A.2) ensures that pB > 0. Notice that pA > pB with this difference increasing in v.
When A supplies its premium content to B, profits are given by:
pnonA ¼pAqA þ wqB ;
pnonB ¼ pB  wð ÞqB :
A chooses wholesale fee w to maximise its profit. However there is a range of parameter values
over which A’s (notionally) profit-maximising choice of w would be rejected by B, as B makes a
higher profit under exclusivity. For the contract to be accepted over this interval A must offer a
lower wholesale fee that satisfies B’s participation constraint pnonB  pexclB . Taking this into account
A’s profit-maximising choice of wholesale fee is
w ¼
bw ¼ 2b2  c2 
2 bþ cð Þ b cð Þ v for v 2 0; bv1ð 
w ¼ 2bþ cð Þ 4b
2  2bcþ c2 
2b b cð Þ 8b2 þ c2  aþ v b cð Þ½  for v 2 bv1; vmax½ 
8>>><
>>:
where40
bv1 ¼ 4b2  2bcþ c2
 
bþ cð Þ 2bþ cð Þ
8b5 þ c5  bc4  b2c3 þ 2b3c2  a:
It can be shown that bw\w for v 2 ð0; bv1Þ, as expected. Notice that the wholesale fee is
increasing in v. In the unconstrained case (i.e. for v 2 ½bv1; vmax, with wholesale fee given by w*)
profits under non-exclusivity are
pnonA ¼
2bþ cð Þ 6b2  bcþ c2 
4b b cð Þ 8b2 þ c2  aþ v b cð Þ½ 2; (A.5)
40 pnonB ¼ pexclB has another root, bv2 ¼ að2bþ cÞð12b3  2b2cþ 3bc2  c3Þ=ð8b5  16b4cþ 2b3c2
3b2c3  bc4 þ c5Þ. Depending on parameter values either bv2\ 0 or bv2 [ vmax, hence this second root is
not relevant.
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pnonB ¼
2b2 þ c2 2
b 8b2 þ c2 2 aþ v b cð Þ½ 2: (A.6)
When B’s participation constraint binds (i.e. for v 2 ð0; bv1, with wholesale fee given by bw)
profits under non-exclusivity are given by:
bpnonA ¼ b
2b cð Þ2 a
2 þ 16b
4  16b3c 2b2c2 þ 6bc3  c4
2 b cð Þ 2b cð Þ2 2bþ cð Þ av
þ 16b
6 b cð Þ  48b5c2 þ 28b3c3 bþ cð Þ  14b2c5  5bc6 þ 2c7
4 bþ cð Þ b cð Þ 2b cð Þ2 2bþ cð Þ2 v
2;
(A.7)
bpnonB ¼ b
2bþ cð Þ2 2b cð Þ2 a 2bþ cð Þ  vbc½ 
2¼ pexclB : (A.8)
To assess A’s incentives for exclusivity we assess the sign of its gain from exclusivity,
G ¼ pexclA  pnonA . In the unconstrained case in which A’s choice of wholesale fee is w* this is
given by
G ¼ M0a2 M1av M2v2;
where
M0 ¼
bþ cð Þ 4b2  2bcþ c2 2
4b b cð Þ 8b2 þ c2  2b cð Þ2 [ 0
M1 ¼ 32b
6  16b5c 8b4c2 þ 8b3c3 þ 2b2c4  bc5 þ c6
2b 8b2 þ c2  2bþ cð Þ 2b cð Þ2 [ 0
M2 ¼ 64b
8  128b7c 32b6c2 þ 64b5c3 þ 4b4c4  8b3c5 þ b2c6  c8
4b 8b2 þ c2  2bþ cð Þ2 2b cð Þ2 :
If the three coefficients M0, M1 and M2 are positive then clearly G < 0. While M0, M1 > 0, it is
possible thatM2 < 0: in this caseG is convex andbecomes positive for sufficiently large v. Evaluating
G at the upper bound vmax it can be shown that G(vmax) < 0, thus G < 0 for v 2 ½bv1; vmax.
When B’s participation constraint binds and A’s choice of wholesale fee is bw , we have
bG ¼  2b2  2bcþ c2 
2 b cð Þ 2b cð Þ av þ
c 4b4 þ 4b3c 6b2c2  bc3 þ 2c4 
4 bþ cð Þ b cð Þ 2bþ cð Þ 2b cð Þ v
2:
Clearly, bG 0ð Þ ¼ 0. Since the second term is positive, bG is convex, becoming positive for sufficiently
large v. Evaluating bG at the boundary bv1it can be shown that bG ðbv1Þ\ 0, thus bG \ 0 for v 2 ð0; bv1.
Since G < 0 and bG \ 0 over the relevant intervals, A always chooses non-exclusivity.
The two firms’ profits under exclusivity and non-exclusivity respectively, as functions of
content value v, are illustrated by the numerical simulation shown in Figure A1. The Figure
shows profits of the two firms for values of v between 0 and vmax = 5. With these parameter valuesbv1 ’ 1:46.
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Appendix B. Switching Costs
The model is solved backwards
B.1. Period 2: Competition with Installed Subscriber Bases
A’s period 1 market share is denoted sA. Distributors can discriminate between their own and the
rival’s installed base, generating two sub-markets in period 2. The analysis allows for the
possibility that one of the two sub-markets may be monopolised in period 2 (i.e. A’s installed base
is served by A alone, or B’s installed base is served by B alone). The following condition ensures
that at least one of the sub-markets remains competitive (and hence that B is not driven out of
the market) under exclusivity and non-exclusivity
t þ r vD þ v: (B.1)
Denoting by pji the price offered by i to j’s installed base, indifferent consumers in the two sub-
markets are located at x 2 [0, sA] and y 2 [sA, 1] where:
x ¼ 1
2t
t þ vA  vB þ r pAA þ pABð Þ;
y ¼ 1
2t
t þ vA  vB  r pBA þ pBBð Þ:
Under exclusivity, vA  vB = vD + v; solving for period 2 equilibrium, profits as functions of sA
are given by
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 1 2 3 4 5
A’s Profit Under Non-exclusivity
B’s Profit Under Non-exclusivity   
A's Profit Under Exclusivity   
B's Profit Under Exclusivity   
v
Profits
Fig. A1. Bertrand Model Profits
Note. Parameter values used in the Figure are a = b = 1 and c = 1/2.
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for sA\
1
4t
t þ v þ vD þ rð Þ:
pex2A ¼ sA t þ v þ vD þ r 2tsAð Þ þ
1
18t
3t þ v þ vD  r 4tsAð Þ2;
pex2B ¼
1
18t
3t  v  vD þ r 2tsAð Þ2;
for sA 2 1
4t
t þ v þ vD þ rð Þ; 1
4t
3t þ v þ vD  rð Þ
 	
:
pex2A ¼
1
18t
t þ v þ vD þ rþ 2tsAð Þ2þ 1
18t
3t þ v þ vD  r 4tsAð Þ2;
pex2B ¼
1
18t
t þ v þ vD þ r 4tsAð Þ2þ 1
18t
3t  v  vD þ r 2tsAð Þ2;
for sA[
1
4t
3t þ v þ vD  rð Þ:
pex2A ¼
1
18t
t þ v þ vD þ rþ 2tsAð Þ2;
pex2B ¼
1
18t
t þ v þ vD þ r 4tsAð Þ2þ 1 sAð Þ 2tsA  t  v  vD þ rð Þ:
Under non-exclusive distribution, vA  vB = vD; solving for period 2 equilibrium, profits as
functions of sA are
for sA\
1
4t
t þ vD þ rð Þ:
pne2A ¼ sA t þ v þ vD þ r 2tsAð Þ þ
v
6t
3t  vD þ r 2tsAð Þ
þ 1
18t
3t þ vD  r 4tsAð Þ 3t þ 3v þ vD  r 4tsAð Þ;
pne2B ¼
1
18t
3t  vD þ r 2tsAð Þ2;
for sA 2 1
4t
t þ vD þ rð Þ; 1
4t
3t þ vD  rð Þ
 	
:
pne2A ¼
1
18t
t þ vD þ rþ 2tsAð Þ2þ 1
18t
3t þ vD  r 4tsAð Þ2þv;
pne2B ¼
1
18t
t þ vD þ r 4tsAð Þ2þ 1
18t
3t  vD þ r 2tsAð Þ2;
for sA[
1
4t
3t þ vD  rð Þ:
pne2A ¼
1
18t
t þ vD þ rþ 2tsAð Þ t þ 3v þ vD þ rþ 2tsAð Þ þ v
6t
5t  vD  r 2tsAð Þ;
pne2B ¼
1
18t
t þ vD þ r 4tsAð Þ2þ 1
2
t þ r vDð Þ 1 sAð Þ:
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Comparing the relevant profit expressions over each interval of sA it can be shown that A’s gain
from exclusivity in period 2 is always negative; 41 i.e. non-exclusive distribution is always chosen in
period 2. This is not surprising: the situation in period 2 is equivalent to the static model of
Section 1. Focusing on the intermediate case where both sub-markets are competitive, note that
period 2 profits are convex in period 1 share sA: combined industry profit is at a minimum at
sA = [(1/2) + vD]/10t), and increases as shares become more asymmetric.
B.2. Period 1: Competition for New Subscribers
At the start of period 1 no consumer is locked in and each retailer sets a single price (pi;i = A, B).
However, they now take account of the impact of their period 1 decisions on period 2 outcomes.
To simplify the analysis I shall focus on the case where both period 2 sub-markets remain
competitive, sA 2 [(t + vD + r)/(4t), (3t + vD  r)/(4t)]; this requires the following parameter
restriction to hold:
t[rþ 18
7
v þ 3
7
vD: (B.2)
Suppose that A chooses exclusivity in period 1. In this case A’s period 1 market share is
sexclA ¼ ðt  pA þ pB þ vD þ vÞ= 2tð Þ and the firms’ total profits over the two periods can be
expressed as
pexclA ¼ pAsexclA þ
1
18t
t þ vD þ rþ 2tsexclA
 2þ 1
18t
3t þ vD  r 4tsexclA
 2þv;
pexclB ¼ pB 1 sexclA
 þ 1
18t
t þ vD þ r 4tsexclA
 2þ 1
18t
3t  vD þ r 2tsexclA
 2
:
Solving for equilibrium under exclusivity one can derive pexclA ¼ t  2r=3 þ ðvD  vÞ=7,
pexclB ¼ t  2r=3  ðvD  vÞ=7 and sexclA ¼ ð1=2Þ þ 5vD þ 9vð Þ= 14tð Þ; thus
pexclA ¼
7
9
t  2
9
rþ 1
9t
r2 þ 1
49t
20vvD þ 18v2 þ 11v2D
 þ 16
21
vD þ 11
7
v;
pexclB ¼
7
9
t  2
9
rþ 1
9t
r2 þ 1
49t
20vvD þ 18v2 þ 11v2D
  16
21
vD  4
7
v:
Suppose instead that A chooses non-exclusivity in period 1. In this case A’s period 1 market share
is sneA ¼ ðt  pA þ pB þ vDÞ=ð2tÞ and the firms’ total profits over the two periods can be
expressed as:
pneA ¼ pAsneA þ v 1 sneA
 þ 1
18t
t þ vD þ rþ 2tsneA
 2þ 1
18t
3t þ vD  r 4tsneA
 2þv;
pneB ¼ pB  vð Þ 1 sneA
 þ 1
18t
t þ vD þ r 4tsneA
 2þ 1
18t
3t  vD þ r 2tsneA
 2
:
Solving for equilibrium under non-exclusivity one can derive pneA ¼ t  2r=3 þ v þ 3vD=21,
pneB ¼ t  2r=3 þ v  3vD=21 and sA = [(1/2) + 5vD]/(14t); thus:
41 In each case G ð2Þr ¼ pex2A  pne2A is convex in sA, decreasing at first and then increasing. The expression
can be shown to be negative at both end-points of the relevant interval of sA, thus it is negative throughout the
interval.
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pneA ¼
7
9
t  2
9
rþ 1
9t
r2 þ 11
49t
v2D þ
16
21
vD þ 2v;
pneB ¼
7
9
t  2
9
rþ 1
9t
r2 þ 11
49t
v2D 
16
21
vD:
Calculating A’s gain from exclusivity in period 1 given period 2 equilibrium, Gr ¼ pexclA  pneA ,
one can derive
Gr ¼ v
49t
18v þ 20vD  21tð Þ:
Appendix C. Platform Investment
Strategic choices include quality investment as well as prices. Under exclusivity, equilibrium
strategies are given by:42
pexclA ¼ t þ
3tvc
9tc 2 ; q
excl
A ¼
1
3c
þ v
9tc 2 ;
pexclB ¼ t 
3tvc
9tc 2 ; q
excl
B ¼
1
3c
 v
9tc 2 ;
giving equilibrium profits
pexclA ¼
1
18c
9tc 1ð Þ
9tc 2ð Þ2 9tc 2þ 3vcð Þ
2;
pexclB ¼
1
18c
9tc 1ð Þ
9tc 2ð Þ2 9tc 2 3vcð Þ
2:
For the market to be competitive under exclusivity we require 9tc  2 ≥ 3vc.
Under non-exclusivity, equilibrium outcomes are symmetric with pnei ¼ t þ v and
qnei ¼ 1=ð3cÞ; market shares are equal. Equilibrium profits are then:
pneA ¼
1
2
t  1
18c
þ v; pneB ¼
1
2
t  1
18c
:
Thus A’s gain from exclusivity, pexclA  pneA , is
Gq ¼ c 9tc 1ð Þ
2 9tc 2ð Þ2 v
2  18tc 5ð Þ
3 9tc 2ð Þ v:
University of Essex
Submitted: 4 January 2012
Accepted: 22 July 2014
42 Note that as c?∞ (raising quality becomes prohibitively expensive), quality investment falls to zero and
outcomes approach the static equilibrium of Section 1; i.e. this model encompasses the static model as the
limiting case.
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